Changes in word meaning and folk theories of reasonable mappings

On The Media
In the parlance of Republican-primary politics, “sanctuaryâ€? – as in sanctuary city – has become a bad word.

GEOFFREY NUNBERG: Well, sometime around 2005, 2006, you begin to hear people on the right using the word, not for these cities and movements that aimed at providing specifically political asylum, but rather to cities that said, look, we just don’t think it’s our business to have our local officials helping the INS.

We don’t want to discourage witnesses from coming forth in criminal cases. We don’t want to discourage parents from bringing their children to emergency rooms. We don’t want to discourage children from coming to school.

So using sanctuary to describe these cities would be sort of like saying that the military, because of its don’t-ask-don’t-tell policy, has become a sanctuary for homosexuals [BOB LAUGHS]because you’re not supposed to be there but we’re not going to ask whether that’s what you’re doing or not.

BOB GARFIELD: Mitt Romney has seized on this word “sanctuary.” Do you think sanctuary is the word that he’s actually trying to communicate or is he trying to use it as a kind of a code for something even more offensive to conservatives?

GEOFFREY NUNBERG: Well, I think sanctuary is very closely related to amnesty. It evokes that word “illegal,” which is used as a noun only to describe people’s immigration status. You don’t say that Jack Abramoff was an illegal because he lobbied illegally, for example.

And, in fact, the word “illegal” has always been used in just that way. It was first introduced in the English language by the British in the 1930s and early ’40s to describe Jews who illegally emigrated to Palestine.

There are some questions here we may want to ask of Nunberg. On the one hand this sort of lexical reframing is perfectly common and  there is nothing strange about it (as much as  we may disagree with its politics).  Why do we then need a linguist to explain it to us? Nunberg’s intervention is problematic in two senses. First, his description of the process is more of a description of a folk theory of the appropriateness of mappings than a real linguistic theory. And second, the all too common assumption of an expert mantle provides legitimacy to statements that are politically engaged. I’m not trying to criticize a fellow linguist (a much more successful one, to boot) for getting engaged in politics. I’m all for that and I agree with his criticism. But this engagement is not linguistics in the sense of disengaged inquiry into the workings of language and communication. It is just engagement in frame negotiation where certain features of the process of language change are hypostasized and exposed to explicit negotiation. This, just like the subject under investigation, is extremely common.

In fact, the last paragraph is engaging in exactly the same “smear campaign” by connotation that the Romney’s of the world like so much. But reminding us that something was first used against Jews is certainly not a neutral context setter.

Again, I disagree with neither Nunberg’s linguistics nor his politics but there’s more to the story than that (as there so often is).

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Lol cats and conventionalization of semiotic systems

Anil Dash: Cats Can Has Grammar
The core behavior has existed for some time; “Image macro” is a generic term for this kind of folk art, and cats have always featured heavily in these types of Internet in-jokes. But a few distinct categories have sprung up that have helped amplify and popularize the phenomenon.

Two things are happening here. First, the very thing Anil Dash is describing. A “grammar” of LOLCats is emerging. However, this is a cognitive construction grammar rather than a traditional grammar in that it doesn’t provide generative (in the broad sense) but rather an inventory of conventionalized units have both highly schematic form and meaning (actually the distance between the semantic and formal poles is very narrow). Anil Dash’s descriptions of the grammar of LOL are actually very close to what a construction grammar would look like. Actually, construction grammar could probably take some lessons from him:

  • I’M IN UR X Ying your Z.
  • Invisible Item.
  • Kitty Pidgin

These are three descriptions of rules a reader might recognize a lolcat utterance. (And it is possible, as Anil Dash notes, to get them wrong.) The interesting thing about it is that he uses a different format for each of the lolcat grammar constructions. And always the one that is most appropriate for recognition and storage. So, wonder I, should construction grammarians adopt the same approach (and run the risk of being accused of not being scientific enough) or should we even consider the fact that these rules may be “stored” in our brains differently? Some as paradigmatic constructions, some imagistic or scriptic, and yet others as schematic formulae such as those applied to the recognition or application of a genre or even a foreign tongue. Another thing, we could probably study how these rules are acquired, spread and developed.

Which brings us to the second point. The act of Mr Dash himself.

I was having a conversation with Ben and Ben a few weeks ago where I suggested this consistent grammar for lolcats could be a “cweeole”. Knowing a bit more about such things now, I realize this isn’t a creole but more likely a pidgin language, used to help cats talk to humans. And since “pidgin” is already a cutesy spelling of a mispronunciation, there doesn’t seem to be any really cute way to rename it to reflect its uniqueness. “Kitty pidgin” might be the closest thing we have to a name for this new language.

There’s a consistent visual vocabulary to the construct, as well. If it ain’t Impact or Arial Black or some other nondescript sans serif font, it ain’t lolcat. White letters with a black outline are a must. But codifying a design guide for lolcats is well beyond my abilities.

Anil Dash is engaging in frame negotiation and acting as an agent similar to those described by Labov (and Asch) who is a significant vector in the spread  of a symbolic system. He is doing the same job linguists do but unlike many linguists, his work is intended to interact with the system itself (and it no doubt does). I’ve described something similar in the arena of fanfiction where along some incredible creative writing there also emerged a considerable body of critical opinion which contributed to the solidification of subgenres and offered a feedback loop to the spontaneously emerging classifications (Uberfic, Slash, etc.). Construction linguists need to investigate what role this kind of behavior plays in the functioning of “natural” languages where the tendency has generally been to neglect the human agency and imply an agency of the “system”. This isn’t necessarily a bad thing but it does ignore something I’m finding more and more evidence for. Next, I’d like to determine how frequent that evidence is and what persistence and salience it has (since frequency isn’t necessarily the only determining factor).

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Searching for coherence in high-stakes utterances

YouTube – Miss Teen USA 2007 – South Carolina answers a question
Miss Teen USA 2007 – Ms. South Carolina answers a question

[youtube]http://youtube.com/watch?v=lj3iNxZ8Dww[/youtube]

It is all too easy to make fun of speakers like this. But most commenters on YouTube (and elsewhere) got it wrong.

ChrisKangaroo It is obviuos that she has no idea what a map is and therefore, she is unable to answer

Or rather, like the speaker above applied the less apt folk theory of linguistic coherence. I.e. things have to make sense. This folk theory got a lot of play around the internets including http://mapsforus.org, the Tube map, and BoingB oing‘s transcription of it into verse.

A much more balanced view including a transcript (reformatted here from the original verse) was provided by an anonymous commenter on BoingBoing:

“I personally believe that U.S. Americans are unable to do so because, uh, some… People out there in our nation don’t have maps, and I believe that our education like such as in South Africa and the Iraq … everywhere like “such as”… and I believe that they should our education over here in the U.S. should help the U.S. or should help South Africa and should help the Iraq and the Asian countries so we will be able to build up our future for us.”

My translation/explanation:

I believe when she started to answer the question, she knew what the question was asking, but probably second-guessed herself into thinking it was more likely that it stated that people from other nations couldn’t locate the U.S. on a map. Thus, she switched her answer around to match that train of thought, concluding that those people couldn’t locate the U.S. on a map primarily because they simply lack maps, and secondarily because they lack proper education, which the U.S. should assist with.

I suspect that Anonymous got it just about right. However, there’s more of the story to be told. Her speech is marked by a constant search for coherence and the possible cohesive links just come too fast for her to process them in a very stressful situation. She is basically trying to integrate a question with several publicly available frames. But these frames come with linguistic structures attached to them and these structures can be reminiscent of other structures that then evoke other (possibly different) framings. (I’m just now playing with the notion of frames as constructions – just gave a talk at NDCL 2 on this topic).

The speaker is using stock phrases (more than likely as a result of explicit training) such as “I personally believe” and more open ended constructions such as “should help” and “out education” that can be integrated with very many constructional clichés of the public political discourse. That is what set her off on the path of the US helping others even though she started with the frame of the US needing help. But every intonation unit of her speech is rife with the quest for coherence. She uses all the right devices to establish it both internally and externally but ultimately fails.

Of course, discursively and intellectually the situation is completely corrupt. The questioner doesn’t give her any space to negotiate the conceptual and linguistic space. The problem with the ridicule isn’t just the picking on the helpless (others can probably do better) but the linguistic and cognitive naivety of the taunters. This speech says nothing about the intelligence of the woman nor her ability to address this issue. It was simply the best she could do in that situation. This should remind us of the fragility of language and cognition.

But having said that, this Quiet Library video is very funny (or at least the first part):

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RQc6oBCuDXk&NR=1----escape_autolink_uri:efabb21a47c1067747e8492a93007103----

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Paradox of the evolutionary metaphor in language death

When Languages Die: Science and Sentiment :
In his book When Languages Die: The Extinction of the World’s Languages and the Erosion of Human Knowledge K. David Harrison illustrates the individual face of language loss, as well as its global scale. He shows that the disappearance of a language is a loss not only for the community of speakers itself but also for our common human knowledge of mathematics, biology, philosophy etc… (from OUPblog)

This extinction of languages, and the knowledge therein, has no parallel in human history. K. David Harrison’s book is the first to focus on the essential question, what is lost when a language dies? What forms of knowledge are embedded in a language’s structure and vocabulary? And how harmful is it to humanity that such knowledge is lost forever? (from Amazon description)

There is an interesting evolutionary scenario often proposed by linguists studying the decline of languages. Language preserves cultural knowledge, it is kind of like a cultural DNA. And just like with our crop species we need to preserve as much diversity as possible and should therefore try to keep smaller languages from disappearing. And similar arguments are posed by proponents of multiculturalism. We need as many perspectives of the world as possible to help us survive. And, frequently, the metaphor holds up. Jarred Diamond makes a very convincing case in ‘Collapse’ for the diversity of perspective as being vital to the survival of social groups under changing environmental (and other conditions). A local categorization can easily be used to uncover something about the flora and fauna. However, a disappearing tense system (while a tragic loss for linguists) or a morphological complexity is unlikely to make much of a difference (no matter what Whorf’s misinterpreters try to claim).

And there is an even deeper paradox hidden in this claim. One part of a ny language is a system of prejudice and discrimination. Should we try to preserve that as well. How about the disappearance of ‘diachronic dialects’? Should we try to preserve the teenage language of the 1980s? Or should we try to preserve the old language of racism and sexism that has been slowly transforming into a new language of racism and sexism more palatable to current mores? Is keeping Huckleberry Finn in the libraries enough? Should we try to support enclaves of racist and homophobic speech? This becomes even more invidious when applied to culture? Should we keep some cultures that subjugate women and practice female genital mutilation just on the off chance that their practices might come in handy one day when the climate changes and we need a new social order?

The problem is that this mourning of the death of languages (and as a linguist I say keep as many as possible) is based on an imperialistically romantic notion of the noble savage and finding “beauty” and “wonderment” in forgotten places. But from a purely investigative perspective there’s no huge need for that. Here’s an idea for a project: “English as an exotic language and Anglos as an exotic peoples” – somebody get on with it.

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From culture-specific to the universal in the US counter-insurgency manual

“Be polite, be professional, be prepared to kill.” Lt. Col. Nagel summarizing a new US Army counterinsurgency manual (on the Daily Show)

This quote reminds of the critique of universalist pragmatics by Anna Wierzbicka. Wierzbicka and others (e.g. Goddard) points out that concepts like politeness (let alone professionalism) are extremely culture and language specific. Politeness is different in culture not only in its overt expressions but also in its cultural context (who to be polite to when) and social consequence. So as a result, soldiers trying to be “polite and professional” are more likely to have to kill people. And killing is of course the most universal of these three concepts (although, even there, interesting and profound differences can be found). The Army supposedly consulted ethnographers and it would be interesting to see what advice they gave, how it was conveyed in the manual and how its meaning is negotiated by soldiers on the ground.

Here’s a suggested formulation for the manual:

Deep down all people are the same and not just in that they bleed when you cut them. But their sameness is hidden under so many intersecting layers of surprising and unsystematic differences (kind of like a mutant cancerous onion) that it may take a life time of interacting with lots of people to find out what it is that they have in common with you. That’s why you should try to kill as few of them as possible. In some cultures own death is not avoided at all costs if there is a common good to be had. Warriors have starved themselves to death to preserve resources for others or let themselves to be killed rather than kill someone (even in self-defence) who is important to the bigger picture or just to be polite and professional. Think about that!

 

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Blurring the lines of folk and expert theory

Its All Semantics – Freakonomics – Opinion – New York Times Blog
A similarly obtuse but less jargon-laden example of unintentially comedic writing is the title of IRS form 5213, which I am convinced was penned by Terry Gilliam a la Crimson Permanent Assurance:
“Election to postpone determination as to whether the presumption applies that an activity is engaged in for profitâ€?.

This is an excerpt from a lengthy discussion of a critique of alleged ‘obtuse’ and ‘jargon-laden’ language used by a professional linguist. The comments basically divide between proponents of a ‘folk theory’ of language use and ‘expert theory’ of language use.

1. Folk theory: Language should be used clearly so that it is understood by most people.  Effort should be made by speakers/writers to use common expressions where they are available. There are some exceptions such as mathematics and physics.
2. Expert theory: In some cases, jargon is acceptable because there are ‘technical meanings’ that are different from ‘common usage’. Otherwise, clarity of expression is valued and obfuscation is to be avoided.

This debate is interesting because we can see the intermingling of the two theories in one place. This suggests that the boundary between expert and folk theory is more like an arbitrary (socially determined) point on a continuum. This is one point where social sciences/humanities may be markedly different from some natural sciences like physics and chemistry.

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Folk theories of conceptual causality and collective autonomy

Film examines Daily Mail ‘diet’ | The Guardian | Guardian Unlimited
In the footsteps of Supersize Me, a documentary-maker has attempted to find out whether we are what we read by giving up all news sources except the Daily Mail.

For 28 days, Nick Angel screened out all television, radio, print and online news sources except for the middle market tabloid.

Mr Angel said: “It’s important to know what the Mail thinks, because it’s a lightning rod (or so it claims) to ‘Middle England’ – that ill-defined and slightly scary mass of people whose various incarnations include the ‘Moral Majority’ and ‘All Right Thinking People’.

I don’t know if Nick Angel realizes it, but he’s in good academic company. An entire field of inquiry called Critical Discourse Analysis (previously Critical Linguistics) is devoted to investigating the overt and covert vision of the media and other forms of public discourse. And like him, they face a potential pitfall, in some of the assumptions of conceptual inevitability as opposed to conceptual autonomy. The title and inspiration of Mr. Angel’s work (I haven’t seen it yet so I can only speculate on the details; but I doubt I’m far off in guessing) is very telling. It starts with an interesting conceptual blend (metaphor) of food and news. Food provides nutrition and nourishment to the body but the wrong composition can have adverse effects on the body. We (our body) have no control over the effects of what we ingest. We can only make choices about what we eat. If news (and information in general) is like that, than we are completely powerless against propaganda. That is quite obviously not true and neither CDA nor Nick Angel would claim that. These people read the Daily Mail professionally and it doesn’t “poison” their minds. If it did, they would stop doing what they are doing and start writing for The Daily Mail. But the implication of this metaphor (blend) is strongly in the direction of strong influences (particularly over ‘casual’, ‘non-critical’ readers) that hold their audience in a kind of a thrall.

Another Guardian correspondent, Peter Cole, a professor of journalism at the University of Sheffield, (who otherwise does a good job of looking at the vision of the Daily Mail) summarizes the picture in this way:

Why middle England gets the Mail | Media | MediaGuardian.co.uk
most of their readers restrict themselves to one paper a day, and find references there to what other papers are saying of little relevance. These readers tend to regard their chosen paper as objective and unbiased and have prejudices against other papers based frequently on never having read them.

Here are two quotes from Teun van Dijk’s 1991 Racism in the Press:

“the manufacture of consent, also through the Dutch Press, is such that the people have the illusion of freedom of opinion, but they do not realize how strongly ideological constraints set the latitude of attitude formation and the terms of the public debate.” (p. 243)

“media as a whole define the internal structures, the points of relevance, and especially the ideological boundaries of social representations. They provide the ready-made [DL] models, that is, the facts and opinions, that people use partly in what to think, but more important which they also used in devising how to think about ethnic affairs.” (p. 244)

However, even van Dijk would admit (and his research shows) that there is a lot of variety of opinion and a significant level of autonomy readers are able to exhibit. The problem is that this autonomy often takes forms that are not very palatable to the liberal elites (of which I am one) or other arbiters of thought and action. Students who don’t take assignments seriously, prisoners who run their institution, patients who seek alternative remedies, job or asylum seekers making the most (gaming) the system, etc. All of these are instances of autonomy that find disfavor with one holder of collective prestige or another.

Indeed, there is a case to be made that some of the less appealing forms of political expression (like the British National Party in the UK) are actually instances of conceptual and intellectual autonomy. The Daily Mail (as well as whatever party publication and the ‘boys down the pub’) notwithstanding, all these people have been exposed since an early age to a concerted inclusionist, secular humanist message. How come they are not the good middle-class liberals we would like everyone to be? Why hasn’t this taken hold? The assumption is that there must be something wrong with them: either they are not smart enough to understand or they were seduced by ‘racist’ propaganda. (This was wonderfully satirized by Woody Allen’s ‘Everybody says I love you’ where a Republican son of a liberal NY family turned out to have a brain tumor, after the removal of which he went back to being a good left-wind Democrat.) But we could also look at them as people who were able to withstand the barrage of liberal propaganda and form their own opinion more suitable to their situation. This is certainly how the right wing in America thinks of themselves (sometimes paradoxically – such as Rush Limbaugh’s supporters calling themselves ‘dittoheads’).

This is how Howard Becker and his collaborators described the student culture in 1961:

“Student culture consists of collective responses to problems posed for students by the environment.” …

“the students collectively set the level and direction of their efforts to learn. [...] these levels and directions are not the result of some conscious cabal, but [...] they are the working-out in practice of the perspectives from which the students view their day-to-day problems in relation to their long-term goals. The perspectives, themselves collectively developed, are organizations of ideas and actions. The actions derive their rationale from the ideas; the ideas are sustained by success in action. The whole becomes a complex of mutual expectations.” (p. 435)

I suspect that we should look for something similar behind the formation of political opinion and the source of political action. In a way, the above quoted Peter Cole summarizes The Daily Mail in a way that is almost celebratory of its ‘autonomy’:

The Mail is ruthlessly edited and always quick off the mark. Its topical features are always on the day rather than tomorrow, and it commissions much more than it uses, an expensive strategy. It has never followed the youth obsession that has so often preoccupied rivals. It regularly serialises books by or about film or pop stars of another age. It seems not to care that the 60s generation is now in its 60s. Is this because more than 40% of its readers are over 55, and 60% over 45?

The story of the ‘idea diet’ is very compelling but clearly insufficient unless we tell some other stories to help us determine its limits. That is not to say that some aspects of the metaphor of ‘consuming’ are not useful as a way of viewing the media (van Dijk’s results and ‘common experience’ indicate that it is consonant with some parts of our social reality). However, if we shouldn’t loose sight of the limits of this metaphor and most importantly we should actively seek to investigate its limits (and with that the limits of our prejudices) rather than remain within the comfort zone of its prototypical validity (both in research and casual conversation).

[A quick note on research as casual conversation. Its purpose is more often than not that of confirming identity and belonging (not unlike two modems making noises at each other). So the challenging of stereotypes there might not be all that feasible (ie. the minute we start doing it, the conversation ceases to be casual). But it is interesting how much academic research and general discussion is also of this nature.]

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Girl Wars, Boy Wars

The Girl Wars : Terrible Mother on Offsprung.com
It seems like half the interactions between women can be classified as Girl Wars. Do we ever get out of this? And why the hell are girls so vicious to each other? When did they start this? Just a few years ago, Thing One was small and sweet and kind, a little kid who cried when I accidentally squashed a ladybug. I can’t imagine her hurting someone on purpose, or someone wanting to hurt her.

First and foremost, this is, hands down the best-written blog on the web (and I know these things, having, as I do, exquisite taste for language and narrative structure). This single post can be used as a pretext for asking a whole lot of interesting (to me with my exquisite tastes) questions.

Let’s start with the really puzzling question of literary quality. There are an enormous number of talented writers on the web (Offsprung features quite a few of them). Why does Terrible Mother stand head and shoulders above so many of them? I’d be the first to admit the subjectivity of narrative aesthetic experience but there are some writers whose quality cannot be disputed regardless of enjoyment. TM is one of them. I (and many good critics) can generally recognize them but if we were to apply an arsenal of recognized techniques of literary analysis would the ‘good ones’ be enmeshed in the web or slip through the cracks (to mix me a metaphor or two)? I suspect conceptual and formal blending has something to do with it. Just the right amount of description to trigger the right images, set up and confound expectations, follow through with the emotions. In other words, the really powerful writer, reconfigures the constraints on conceptual integration that usually apply in our world of speech and thought and substitutes those applying in a world over which she has full control. Given that blending is not a discrete serial algorithmic process but rather a massively parallel fuzzy process, in which underspecification of reference is as important as the profiling and backgrounding of conceptual elements, it is unlikely that the identification of quality can be completely universal or subject to traditional ‘academic’ analysis. No wonder, then, that so much literary criticism (all of it, in fact) is mostly poetry about poetry. And, on reflection, despite the formalists, structuralists’ and others’ efforts to the contrary, may be a good thing.
Now for something completely different: Feminism and social psychology. First, both ‘boys’ and ‘girls’ can be cruel in the folk theoretical framings currently being negotiated in the Anglo culture. Some have expressed a surprise at Private Lyndie English and others have seen it as a confirmation of the untenability of the ‘women as the gentler sex’ hypothesis. Quite obviously, human beings, when put in certain configurations will display the kind of ‘banal evil’ that when given an institutional backing can devolve into repression or genocide (Arendt, Baumann). It’s been more than thirty years since the Stanford prison experiment and Milgram’s work and over half a century since Asch’s work on conformity. Jane Elliott replays many of these in her Class Divided and Blue Eyed work. (It is interesting on its own that these seminal results have not made more of an impact in education and social science.) All of these experiments play themselves out daily in ‘boy groups’ and ‘girl groups’ in the ‘innocent’ guise of BFFs and ‘frenemies’.

Now for the advice to educators and parents (just as an interested observer rather than an active participant). The one concern expressed in public debates and private moments of anguish by parents is whether their child will be bullied in school. But in fact, the question they should be really asking, will their child be a bully? This is in some respects much more likely. Not because their child is bad (it is likely that only a comparatively few children are truly evil) but because of the capacity of enforced group identities to produce ‘banal evil’. But it is also interesting how little effect the efforts of educators seem to have. ‘How do you think that feels’ is as useful in engendering desired behavior as ‘have you taken out the trash?’. They should really look at some of the answers Milgram and Zimbardo offer. Some people seem to have an intrinsic ability to overcome the pressures put upon them by the authority of the individual or the group but most need help. In the groups of tweenagers, this is difficult because the sources of authority and prestige are so fluid. Adults play a certain role but the peer group is beginning to assert itself more and more. Furthermore, it is difficult to identify how a single individual will be influenced by their context. So an individual parent is pretty much stuck.
Social psychology can explain and predict group behavior pretty well but is much less successful at the individual. Psychoanalysis does not as good but decent job of the individual at the start and the end of the process of group interaction but is useless at navigating throughout simply because it cannot account for all the variable the group configuration will present. Bottom line, parenting is difficult for all and agonizing for the secular humanist parents. But in the hands of a gifted writer like Terrible Mother, it makes a hell of good read.

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Networks of trust and the newspaper business

Virtual Economics: Why newspapers are not screwed
…newspapers’ core value is not their content but their validation. Sure it’s expensive to create content. In the long run this probably doesn’t really matter. There’s plenty of content. The value that newspapers add to the picture is verifying which of it is true.

The problem with many of the assumptions about the democratizing power of the internets, has been exactly this. The fact that anybody can post something online still doesn’t obviate the social needs for establishing networks of trust. That goes for art, as well as music. Often, people are not sure whether it is appropriate to like something until an appropriate trusted sources has given it a seal of approval. The problem is that there is privilege and power associated with being in a center of a network of trust. So a lot of people will vie for that position thus disturbing the supposedly egalitarian nature of the environment. Social networking can replicate some of this by automating trust (such as Digg’s algorithms) but it can’t completely do away with it. That’s why it’s likely that something newspaper-like will persist long after the last printed copy of the New York Times has been sold. (Of course, hopefully, it will have been replaced by ereaders with proper eink.)

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Bill O’Reilly on the 8:05 from Brighton

‘Bourne’ flick is ultimately un-American – Opinion & Editorial – BostonHerald.com
I knew this movie was trouble when I read the reviews. Almost all the critics liked it. The only way American movie critics would like a violent car-chase film like this was if it bashed the USA, which, of course, it does.

As the casualty count rose, I kept thinking about all those disability payments we taxpayers would have to pick up.

Now, all of this is harmless nonsense to those of us who understand the hero and villain business, and realize the simplistic bias that permeates Hollywood. But to impressionable audiences, the anti-American theme could resonate.

Apart from the fact that Bill O’Reilly is a half-witted bully and quite probably insane, he resonates strangely with some people doing critical discourse analysis. At the very start of the movement, Hodge and Kress (1979) wrote the following about a mildly right-wind editorial:

“As readers of this editorial we should have to be alert and willing to engage in mental exercise to get beyond the seductive simplicity of the final form, with just three entities, and seemingly precise relations, where everything seems to be there on the surface.” … “few commuters on the 8.05 from Brighton would have the energy to perform the mentail gymnastics required. Especially as they would have to perform them not once, but just about a dozen times on every full line of newsprint that they scan. After all, the crossword is there for mental exercise.” (p. 22)

This brings up a crucial question of our individual and collective autonomy of our cognitive system. Only the initiated, one folk theory goes, can truly overcome propaganda (be it political or contained in advertising) while others are completely under the spell of whatever their social and psychological cognition serves up.  But this unwitting agreement of these two forces (mutually recognized as evil) should be enough for us to doubt the ease with which such a theory should be promulgated. There is enough evidence for both easy suggestibility (see Lakoff’s ‘don’t think of an elephant’) and remarkable independence (Becker, Gamson). Further investigation is clearly needed.

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